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Abstract
This note studies the trade of indivisible goods using credit or money in a fric-
tional market. We show how indivisibility matters for monetary equilibrium under
di¤erent assumptions about price determination. Bargaining generates a price and
allocation that are independent of the nominal interest or ination rate over some
range. This is not the case with price posting and directed search. In either case,
we provide conditions (the nominal rate cannot be too high) under which stationary
monetary equilibrium exists, and we show it is unique or generically unique.
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1 Introduction
The New Monetarist framework has been increasing in popularity, with applications in
areas such as nance, payment systems, and monetary policy analysis (see the survey
by Lagos et al. (2016)). The earliest search-based models of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989,
1993) had indivisible goods and indivisible money, making every trade a one-for-one swap.
Later, Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) kept indivisible money but introduced
divisible goods to determine prices. Subsequently, Shi (1997) and Lagos andWright (2005)
made both goods and money divisible. This note completes the picture by exploring the
remaining case of indivisible goods and divisible money.
Far from being merely a mathematical exercise on the remaining logical possibility, we
think this is substantively important. Many goods are, in fact, indivisible, and continuous
divisibility is often an abstraction designed to make the analysis easier, not for the sake of
realism. We take indivisibility seriously, and show how it matters in pairwise trading. To
make the environment comparable with previous models (e.g., Shi (1995) or Trejos and
Wright (1995)), our consumers want to consume exactly one unit. We explore equilibrium
with credit and with money. We consider bargaining with random search as well as price
posting with directed search.1 Under credit buyers do not incur a cost from bringing
a resource to trade. However, they do with money and this matters, especially under
bargaining. We also consider lotteries, which can be part of an e¢ cient trading mechanism
with indivisibility.
With pure credit, equilibrium exists uniquely, and all potential buyers participate in
the market, with bargaining or with price posting. With money, the outcome depends
on the mechanism that determines the terms of trade. With bargaining, as long as the
nominal interest rate is not too high, (stationary) monetary equilibrium exists uniquely.
In this equilibrium, buyers bring the lowest amount of money necessary to make sellers
indi¤erent between trading or not trading, akin to making take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. For
a low range of nominal interest rates, all potential buyers participate in the market, and
money is superneutral ination does not a¤ect the real allocation. However, for a higher
range of nominal interest rates, not all buyers participate, and the allocation is a¤ected
by ination. These results hold with and without lotteries.
With price posting, it is easy to show lotteries are not necessary. We again show
existence, and generic uniqueness, as long as the nominal interest rate is not too high.
As with bargaining, when the nominal interest rate is low, all buyers participate. By
increasing the nominal rate, eventually, some buyers stop participating, and ultimately
1Price posting with directed search is often called competitive search (Moen (1997), Mortensen and
Wright (2002)). It has been used in monetary economics by Julien et al. (2008) with indivisible money,
and by Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) with divisible money.
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the monetary equilibrium ceases to exist. Because the equilibrium price depends on
the number of participating buyers under competitive search, while it does not under
bargaining, the threshold for the nominal interest rate di¤ers between bargaining and
price posting. In summary, the indivisibility of goods and the mechanism for determining
the terms of trade have important implications on the ability of money to generate real
e¤ects.
There is some related work on divisible money with indivisible goods, but it focuses
only on random rather than competitive search. In Green and Zhou (1998), indivisibility
together with posting and random search leads to indeterminacy of monetary steady state.
Those results are extended to an environment closer to our setup by Jean et al. (2010)
with at money and Rabinovich (2016) with commodity money. Our results show how
this indeterminacy problem vanishes with either bargaining or price posting. Galenianos
and Kircher (2008) have indivisible goods but the environment is quite di¤erent they
assume multilateral meetings with the terms of trade determined by second-price auction.
Liu et al. (2011, 2015) consider indivisible goods but use noisy search as in Burdett and
Judd (1983), and focus on di¤erent issues.
2 Environment
The environment is based on the alternating markets framework of Rocheteau and Wright
(2005).2 Time is discrete and goes on forever. A continuum of buyers and sellers, with
measures N and 1; live forever. Agents discount between periods with factor  2 (0; 1),
but not across markets within a period, and r = 1=   1 is the discount rate. In each
period, there are two consecutive markets. The rst market to open is a decentralized
market (DM), and the second is a frictionless centralized market (CM). Both buyers and
sellers consume a divisible good in the CM, while only buyers consume an indivisible good
in the DM.
Buyers preferences within a period are given by U(x)   h + u1, where x is CM
consumption, h is CM labor, u is DM utility from consuming the indivisible good, and 1
is an indicator function giving 1 if trade occurs and 0 otherwise. Sellerspreferences are
U(x)   h   c1 with DM good produced at constant cost c. We assume u > c. Let x be
the CM numeraire. We assume that x is produced one-to-one from labor h.
Trade in the DM implies a price and quantity bundle (p; q) 2 P Q where P = f0 
p  Lg and Q = f0; 1g. L represents the available liquidity in the economy with credit
2The original alternating markets framework by Lagos and Wright (2005) has agents receiving a
preference shock in the CM, revealing whether they will be a buyer or a seller in the DM. In Rocheteau
and Wright (2005), buyers are always buyers and sellers are always sellers. All our results hold for both
frameworks.
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or money to be dened below.
In the DM, meetings occur according to a general meeting technology, which is assumed
homogeneous of degree one. Given the buyer-seller ratio n  N , which is also the measure
of participating buyers in the DM, the meeting rate for sellers is (n), and (n)=n for
buyers. Assume 0 > 0, 00 < 0, (0) = 0, limn!1 (n) = 1, and limn!0 0(n) = 1.
3 Credit
Consider an economy in which commitment is feasible. Agents are not anonymous. Record
keeping and punishment devices are available. In this environment, there is no role for
money. Rather, sellers in the DM produce for buyers with the buyers promising to deliver
x in the subsequent CM. We assume an exogenous credit constraint p  D, where p is
the real price and liquidity constraint L = D > 0.
Buyers in the CM obtain
W bt (d) = max
x;h

U (x)  h+ V bt+1
	
s.t. x = h  d, (1)
where d is the buyers debt coming out of the DM, i.e. d = p if a purchase, and d = 0
otherwise. Buyers participate in the DM if V bt+1  0. Using the budget constraint to
eliminate h and solving for optimal x yieldsW bt (d) =  d+V bt+1 with  = U(x) x.
Sellers in the CM get
W st (d) = max
x;h

U (x)  h+ V st+1
	
s.t. x = h+ d,
where d = p if a sale, and d = 0 otherwise. This simplies to W st (d) =  + d + V
s
t+1.
Sellers participate in the DM if V st+1  0. The buyers payo¤ in the DM is
V bt =
 (N)
N

u+W bt (p)

+

1   (N)
N

W bt (0) .
A buyer that trades obtains credit p, to be paid in the next CM, and gets utility u from
DM consumption. Using linearity of W in d, for buyers and similarly for sellers,
V bt = W
b
t (0) +
 (N)
N
(u  p) and V st = W st (0) +  (N) (p  c) : (2)
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3.1 Bargaining
Upon meeting, a buyer and a seller solve the generalized Nash bargaining problem
max
p
(u  p) (p  c)1  s.t. p  D.
Proposition 1 In the model with credit and bargaining, 9! stationary equilibrium (SE)
if D  c, characterized by
pB =
(
pB if D > pB
D if D  pB;
where pB = (1  )u+ c.
All buyers are active in this environment since using credit is costless and (u  
pB)(N)=N > 0, for all pB. We show below that introducing money in the DM can
result in n < N active buyers.
3.2 Competitive Search
We study competitive search equilibrium with price posting. As in Moen (1997) and
Rocheteau and Wright (2005), instead of a single DM, there exist a continuum of submar-
kets, each identied by masses of sellers posting the same terms of trade. Sellers post and
commit to DM prices before buyers enter the DM. After observing all posted prices, each
buyer chooses a submarket giving the maximum surplus. Each seller can only produce for
one buyer in each period. If a seller is visited by multiple buyers, he chooses one with an
equal probability. Let n represent the expected queue length for any seller in a submarket
o¤ering price p. The meeting rates now depend on the queue length induced by price,
instead of the aggregate N .
Buyerspayo¤ in the CM is
W bt (d) =   d+ max
p^;n^

 (n^)
n^
(u  p^) +W bt+1 (0)

,
where (p^; n^) refers to t+1. The sellers payo¤in the DM is V st = W
s
t (0)+max
p;n
f (n) (p  c)g.
Let 
 be the equilibrium expected utility of a buyer in the DM. Sellers solve
max
p;n
 (n) (p  c) s.t.  (n)
n
(u  p)  
, p  D.
Solve for p from the buyers participation constraint, and substitute it into the sellers
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objective function,
max
n
 (n)

u  c  n

 (n)

s.t. u  n

 (n)
 D.
Proposition 2 In the model with credit and competitive search, 9! symmetric SE if D 
c, characterized by
pc =
(
pc if D > pc
D if D  pc
where pc = [1  "(n)]u+ "(n)c, and n = N .
This result is identical to the case with bargaining when "(N) =  (Hosios (1990)).
Again, (u  pc)(N)=N > 0 for all pc, and all buyers are active in the DM.
4 Money
Now assume agents in the DM cannot commit and there are no enforcement or punishment
mechanisms. Therefore, buyers must pay sellers with cash in the DM. Let M st be the
money supply per buyer at time t, with M st = M
s
t 1 and the growth rate of money, ,
is constant. Changes in M s occur in the CM via lump-sum transfers (taxes) if  > 1
( < 1). Nominal interest rate is given by the Fisher equation 1 + i = = and we assume
 > . The Friedman rule is the limiting case i! 0. Dene t as the CM price of money
in terms of xt, and 1=t as the nominal price level. Liquidity available is then L = tmt.
In stationary equilibrium, t=t+1 = . Since there is a cost of carrying money, which may
not be covered by the buyers surplus from DM trade, we allow endogenous participation
by buyers and let n denote the ratio of active buyers to sellers in the DM.
Buyers with money holding m in the CM solve
W bt (m) = max
x;h;m^

U(x)  h+ V bt+1 (m^)
	
s.t. x = t (m+ T ) + h  tm^, (3)
where m^ is the money holding carried to the next DM, and T represents net transfers
from the government only given to buyers. Eliminating h from the budget equation,
W bt (m) =  + t (m+ T ) + max
m^

V bt+1 (m^)  tm^
	
. (4)
Sellers do not bring money into the DM. Thus, W st (m) =  + tm + V
s
t+1 represents
their CM value.
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Buyerspayo¤ in the DM is
V bt (m) =
 (n)
n

u+W bt

m  p
t

+

1   (n)
n

W bt (m) , (5)
where n represents the number of active buyers in the DM. If a buyer gets to trade, he
pays p and gets u. Linearity, @W bt =@m = t, allows us to write
V bt (m) =
 (n)
n
(u  p) +W bt (m) and V st =  (n) (p  c) +W st (0) .
4.1 Bargaining
The generalized Nash bargaining problem is
max
p
(u  p) (p  c)1  s.t. p  m, u  p  0, p  c  0. (6)
As is standard when  > , the feasibility constraint, p  m, binds and c  m  pB,
where pB = (1   )u + c as in Proposition 1. Any negotiated price pB 2 [c; pB] is a
potential bargaining solution. Substituting V bt+1 into W
b
t yields the following CM value
function
W bt (m) =  + t (m+ T ) + W
b
t+1 (0) + max
m^2[m; m]


 (n)
n
 
u  t+1m^
  it+1m^ , (7)
where m = c
t+1
and m = p
B
t+1
. Since buyers surplus decreases in m^, optimal money
holding decision in (7) reduces to t+1m^ = c. A buyer e¤ectively commits to not paying
more than c by bringing exactly t+1m^ = c. The solution is akin to buyers making a
take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to sellers in pairwise meetings.
For equilibrium, it has to be individually rational for buyers to participate. Dene
v(m^) =
 (n)
n
 
u  t+1m^
  it+1m^. (8)
The buyers free entry condition v(c=t+1) = 0 implies
i =
 (n)
n
(u  c)
c
= 	 (n) . (9)
Given i, (9) uniquely determines the measure of active buyers in the DM, n. The match-
ing rate (n)=n is decreasing in n, and so is 	(n), with @n(i)=@i < 0. Higher i, leads
to fewer active buyers in the DM, reduces congestion and increases the marginal gain of
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entering the DM. Dene {N = 	(N) and {B = (u  c)=c.
Proposition 3 In the model with money and bargaining: (i) For i  {N , 9! stationary
monetary equilibrium (SME) with n = N ; (ii) for i 2 ({N ;{B), 9! SME with n < N ;
(iii) for i  {B, @ SME.
Real balances in equilibrium only depend on c, and not on the bargaining power  or
the nominal rate i. Buyers move rst by choosing money balances and commit to bringing
the lowest level of real balances acceptable for trade. The nominal interest rate has no
e¤ects on the DM real price, buyers real balances, or the real value of money. For case
(i), all buyers participate in the DM and the total output is not a¤ected by i, either.
Therefore, money is superneutral in this model for small nominal interest rates. For case
(ii), as i increases, n falls and increases (n)=n. Buyers trade faster, a hot potato
e¤ect as in Liu et al. (2011).
This result di¤ers from most of the New Monetarist literature, which generally fea-
tures neutrality of money but real allocations are a¤ected by changes in ination. The
generalized Nash bargaining mechanism determines the buyers share of surplus according
to exogenous bargaining power, which then determines the unique optimal real balance.
Monetary variables do not play a role in the determination of real variables, but only
a¤ect the price of money .
When it is costless to carry money to the DM, i.e. i = 0, the monetary economy
is comparable to the credit economy in Section 3.1, but with di¤erent price in the DM.
When i = 0, buyers still choose to carry just enough real balance to cover the sellers
reservation price c, so as to maximize their surplus from trade. As shown in Proposition
1, the equilibrium price with credit is almost always higher than the sellers reservation
price. This is because when facing an exogenous credit constraint, buyers do not have the
power to e¤ectively commit to paying c ex ante.
4.1.1 Lotteries
We introduce lotteries because lotteries are usually e¢ cient mechanisms in non-convex
economies. Let E = P  f0; 1g denote the space of trading events, and E the Borel -
algebra. Dene a lottery to be a probability measure ! on the measurable space (E; E).
We can write !(p; q) = !q(q)!pjq(p) where !q(q) is the marginal probability measure of q
and !pjq(p) is the conditional probability measure of p on q. Without loss of generality,
as shown in Berentsen et al. (2002), we restrict attention to  = Prfq = 1g and 1   =
Prfq = 0g, and !pj0(p) = !pj1(p) = 1. Randomization is only useful on q because Q is
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non-convex. Thus,  2 [0; 1] is the probability that the good is produced and traded.3
The bargaining problem with lotteries becomes
max
p;
(u  p) (p  c)1  s.t. p  m,   1, and u  p  c:
Lemma 1 The solution to the bargaining problem with lotteries is
 
pB; B

=
8>>>><>>>>:
 
pB; 1

if m > pB
(m; 1) if pB  m  pB 
m; m=pB

if c  m < pB
(0; 0) if m < c
where pB = (1  )u+ c and pB = uc=(u+ (1  )c).
Buyers payo¤ in the CM is
W bt (m) =  + t (m+ T ) + W
b
t+1 (0) + max
m^
v (m^) ,
where v (m^) = (n)(Bu  pB)=n  it+1m^.
Proposition 4 In the monetary model with bargaining and lotteries: (i) For i  iN ,
9! SME with t+1m^ = pB, B = 1 and n = N ; (ii) for i 2 (iN ;{B), 9! SME with
t+1m^ = p
B, B = 1 and n < N ; (iii) for i  {B, @ SME.
First, given that t+1m^ = p
B, n does not decrease with ination when i  iN .
Money is still superneutral. For i 2 (iN ;{B), real balances stay constant but n changes
with i. Second, lotteries benet sellers. With lotteries, the sellers surplus from a DM
trade is pB   c, compared to zero surplus from a trade without bargaining over lotteries.
Because of lotteries, buyers now bring exactly enough money to achieve the maximum
expected surplus from trade at B = 1. Third, introducing lotteries makes it harder
for a monetary equilibrium to exist, which is easy to see from {B = (u   c)=c in the
lottery case being smaller than {B = (u   c)=c without lotteries. Fourth, with lotteries,
the nominal interest rate cut o¤ values increase with the buyers bargaining power .
Finally, compared to Berentsen et al. (2002), the probability B does not change with
respect to the buyers bargaining power or the ination rate. Introducing lotteries with
indivisible goods and divisible money, the total surplus from trade is a¤ected but not
price. However, introducing lotteries with indivisible money and divisible goods, the total
3We only study lotteries in money and bargaining because lotteries are trivial for other cases. In
competitive search  = 1 always holds, and in credit and bargaining,  < 1 only if D is severe enough.
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surplus from trade stays the same but price changes according to the value of lotteries in
equilibrium.
4.2 Competitive Search
Under competitive search and price posting, the buyers DM value function becomes
V bt (p;m) =
 (n)
n
(u  p) +W bt (m) , (10)
where p is the price posted by the buyers chosen seller. From (4) and (10) buyersvalue
is
W bt (m) =  + t (m+ T ) + W
b
t+1 (0) + max
m^;p;n


 (n)
n
(u  p)  it+1m^

. (11)
Since sellers post p before buyers choose their money holdings, t+1m^ = p as long as i > 0.
Let 
 again be the equilibrium expected utility of a buyer in the DM. Sellers maximize
max
p;n
(n) =  (n) (p  c) s.t.  (n)
n
(u  p)  ip  
, (12)
or
max
n
(n) =  (n)

 (n)u  n

 (n) + ni
  c

, (13)
and the sellers optimal price is
pc(i) =
 (n) f[1  " (n)]u+ " (n) cg+ " (n)nic
 (n) + " (n)ni
. (14)
In equilibrium, n is consistent with the free entry condition
 (n)
n
(u  pc(i))  ipc(i)  0. (15)
Thus, (14) and (15) determine (pc(i); n(i)). Unlike bargaining, pc depends on i, and
jointly determined with n, the measure of active buyers in the market.
We follow Gu and Wright (2016) in establishing the existence and uniqueness of mon-
etary equilibrium. Dene the aggregate demand of liquidity, Ld = npc, with n and pc
both depending on i. Monetary equilibrium is then characterized by the intersection of
Ld and the relevant supply curve, which is horizontal at the exogenous policy variable, i.
The nominal interest rate is the price of holding liquidity. It determines the equilibrium
quantity via Ld.
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Lemma 2 There exist iN and {C with iN < {C, dened in the proof, such that: (i) for
i < iN , 9! Ld with n = N and dLd=di < 0; (ii) for generic i 2 [iN ;{C ], 9! Ld with n  N
and dLd=di < 0; (iii) for i > {C, @ n > 0 and Ld is not well-dened.
Then,
Proposition 5 In the model with money and competitive search: (i) for i < iN , 9!
symmetric SME with n = N ; (ii) for generic i 2 [iN ;{C ], 9! symmetric SME with
n  N (< if i > iN); (iii) for i > {C, @ SME.
From Proposition 5, buyersreal balance, i.e. pc, is always a¤ected by i, and money is
not superneutral, but still neutral. For case (i) pc is strictly decreasing in i, and n = N .
Hence, buyersexpected surplus is increasing in i, and indirectly buyersbargaining power
a¤orded by the market is increasing. For case (ii) as shown in the proof, @n(i)=@i < 0.
High ination then increases buyersprobability of trade, and expected surplus seen from
ipc(i) in (15). It is easy to show @ipc=@i > 0. This is in line with the hot potatoe¤ect
from Liu et al. (2011). They show that more ination leads to higher probability of
trade (and surplus) for buyers with divisible goods, money, and bargaining, through the
extensive margin. They do not study price posting.
Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) consider bargaining and competitive search with divisible
goods and money, and derive how buyerssurplus is a¤ected by search intensity. With
bargaining, search intensity decreases with ination, and buyerssurplus decreases with
i. Both buyers share of surplus and probability of trade decrease with i. Thus, they
nd no hot potatoe¤ect, while we nd this e¤ect for high ination. With competitive
search, for small i, they generate an increasing share of expected surplus for buyers, while
the expected surplus still decreases with i. When i is close to zero, the fall of expected
surplus is second-order e¤ect, while the increase of buyersshare is rst-order. Hence,
buyerssurplus increases for a range of i, and so does the probability of trade. Therefore,
they nd a "hot potato" e¤ect for a low ination range. After a threshold of i, they
nd that both buyersexpected surplus and probability of trade decreases with i. Thus,
no "hot potato" e¤ect for high range of ination. We nd the reverse, no hot potato
e¤ect for low range of ination, but the e¤ect comes in for high range of ination. Thus,
indivisibility matters.
Competitive search provides a natural environment to get (generically) unique equi-
librium. Buyers direct their search to sellers that give the highest expected payo¤. Com-
petition among sellers guarantees that a buyer gets 
 from the DM trade. The expected
queue length adjusts continuously with the posted price, and the market-clearing price in
the DM is uniquely determined. The fact that this adjustment mechanism does not exist
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under price posting and random search leads to the existence of a continuum of monetary
equilibria, as in Green and Zhou (1998) and Jean et al. (2010).4
5 Conclusion
In this note, we study the trade of indivisible goods in frictional markets. Overall, the
consequences of indivisibility on the goods side matter and di¤er from indivisibility on the
money side. In particular, when terms of trade are determined by bargaining with money,
the bargained price gives sellers no surplus and is independent of the nominal interest
rate. Money is superneutral as long as all buyers participate in the market. Introducing
lotteries cannot reestablish the link between real balances and anticipated ination under
bargaining. However, price posting with competitive search does reestablish this link
because the equilibrium price of the indivisible good depends on the nominal interest rate
and the number of buyers in the market.
In the pure credit economy, we show uniqueness under bargaining and competitive
search. We also show uniqueness under bargaining in the monetary economy. Under
competitive search, we get uniqueness for generic parameters. While we have focused on
stationary equilibrium, the model can easily be used to study price dynamics. We leave
that for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The stationary equilibrium with credit is characterized by
the solution to the bargaining problem. Using  as the multiplier on the credit constraint
yields the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
0 = (1  )(u  p)(p  c)    (u  p) 1(p  c)1     and 0 =  (D   p) :
If  = 0, then p = (1  )u + c  pB. However, if  > 0, then p = D. Finally, we need
D  c to guarantee non-negative surplus for sellers.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is similar to Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, i  {N = 	(N) implies vN(c)  vN(0) and hence (i).
For (ii), we need limn!0 	(n) = (u   c)=c = {B, which is assured by the assumptions of
4Apart from existence, our results di¤er quite substantially from those of Jean et al (2010). They
consider price posting and random search to show a continuum of equilibria indexed by di¤erent real
balances. Their result is driven by coordination failure from simultaneous moves by buyers and sellers.
To obtain a unique equilibrium, they impose the assumptions of nite agents and sequential move.
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(n). Finally, for i  {B, vn(c) < vn(0) for all n > 0, and the DM is inactive.
Proof of Lemma 1. We have the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions
0 =   (u  p) 1 (p  c)1  + (1  ) (u  p) (p  c)    1 (16)
0 = u (u  p) 1 (p  c)1    c (1  ) (u  p) (p  c)    2 (17)
0 = 1 (tm  p) , 0 = 2 (1  ) ,
with 1 and 2 being the multipliers on the monetary and lotteries constraint. If 1 = 0,
pB =  pB. Substituting into (17) implies 2 > 0, and hence B = 1, which requires
m > pB. If B < 1, then 2 = 0 and pB = pB. Substituting into (16) implies 1 > 0
and pB = m, hence m < pB. If 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, pB = m and B = 1. 1 > 0
implies m < pB, and 2 > 0 implies m > pB. Finally, there is no trade if m < c.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, the buyer does not want to bring t+1m^ > pB if
i > 0, or t+1m^ < c for no trade. Then, for t+1m^ 2 (pB; pB), v0(m^) =  t+1(n)=n  
it+1 < 0, and the optimal money holding is t+1m^ = p
B. For t+1m^ 2 (c; pB), v0(m^) =
t+1 [(n)(u  c)=nc  i]. Since pB[(n)(u c)=nc  i] =  (n)
 
u  pB =n  ipB, v0(m^)
shares the same sign as  (n)
 
u  pB =n  ipB. Suppose v0(m^) < 0, then buyers choose
t+1m^ = c and 
B = 0. Suppose v0(m^) > 0, then buyers with measure n choose t+1m^ =
pB. The cuto¤ i satisfying v0(m^) = 0 is {B = limn!0 (n)(u   pB)=npB = (u   c)=c.
Therefore, if i < {B, 9! SME with t+1m^ = pB and B = 1; otherwise, there is no
monetary equilibrium. Dene iN = (N)(u   pB)=NpB = (N)(u   c)=Nc < {B. If
i  iN , n = N ; otherwise, n < N .
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove the existence and uniqueness of Ld, it is su¢ cient
to show the existence and uniqueness of n > 0. Substitute pc into (15) and we get
" (u  c) i + 2" (u  c) =n   [(1  ")u+ "c] i + "nci2. Dene h(n; i) = "(u  
c)i + 2"(u   c)=n   [(1   ")u + "c]i   "nci2. Given any n 2 (0; N ], h(n; i) = 0 is a
quadratic function in i, with two real solutions of opposite signs. The positive solution
i+(n), satisfying h(n; i+) = 0, is an implicit function of n. Let i+(0) = limn!0 i+(n) <
1. It is easy to show i+(n) is continuous on [0; N ]. Dene iN by h(N; iN) = 0 and
{C = maxn2[0;N ] i+(n). For i < iN , h(N; i) > 0 then n = N . Thus, Ld = Npc(N; i) is
unique, and @Ld=@i = N@pc(N; i)=@i < 0, hence (i). For i > {C , h(n; i) < 0 8n, and the
free-entry condition does not hold since (n)(u  pc)=n   ipc < 0, hence (iii).
Regarding (ii), for i  {C , h(n; i) = 0 always holds for some n > 0, and Ld exists.
To show that Ld is generically unique and monotone, consider Ld = npc and dLd=di =
@Ld=@i + (@Ld=@n)(@n=@i). Given h(n; i) = 0, Ld = (n)nu=[(n) + in], hence
@Ld=@i < 0 and @Ld=@n > 0. Then, it is su¢ cient to show n is generically unique
and @n=@i < 0. Next, we want to show that n is unique and @n=@i < 0 for generic
13
i. Suppose (n1; i) = (n

2; i) = maxn (n; i) and n

2 > n

1. Then, n

1 is the minimum n
maximizing (n; i), and (n1; i) > (n; i), 8n < n1. For small " > 0, (n1; i+") > (n; i+
") also holds for n < n1 due to continuity. If @
2=@i@n < 0, then (n1; i+") > (n

2; i+"),
and there is a unique global maximizer in the neighborhood of n1. Finally, we need to
show @2=@i@n < 0. Derive @=@n from (13),
@
@n
=
( + in) [(u  c)0   ic]  i (1  ") [(u  c)  inc]
( + in)2 =
.
Dene T (i) = (+ in)[(u  c)0  ic]  i(1  ")[(u  c)  inc], and T 0(i) = n[(u  c)0 
ic]   ( + in)c   (1   ")[(u   c)   inc] + inc(1   "). Since Tn=n = 0, @2=@i@n =
T 0(i)=[( + in)2=]. With (u  c)  inc > 0, we have
T 0n=n(i) =
  [ (u  c)  inc] (1  ")  c ( + in) ( + in")
 + in
< 0,
and @2=@i@n < 0 holds. Although arg maxn (n; i) may have more than one solution
for some i  {C , the set of such i has measure zero, hence (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5. First, for i > {C , n < 0 as shown in Lemma 2, and there is no
monetary equilibrium, hence (iii). For i < iN , Ld is unique and monotonically decreasing
in i. Hence, given i, there exists a unique real money holding t+1m^ = p
c and a unique
SME. Since h(N; i) > 0 and (N)(u pc)=N   ipc > 0, we have n = N , thus (i). Finally,
as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, Ld is generically unique and @Ld=@i < 0 for i 2 [iN ;{C ].
Therefore, there exists a generically unique real balance t+1m^ and symmetric SME with
n  N . The inequality is strict if i > iN .
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